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THE DRAGON LOOKS NORTH: THE ARCTIC, CHINA,
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA BRING PROSPECTS FOR NEW
OPPORTUNITIES AND NEW PERILS
Peter Rosene*
I. INTRODUCTION
The dream of so many during the Age of Exploration is becoming a
reality. The Northwest Passage above North America and the Northern Sea
Route above Eurasia are slowly becoming navigable waterways due to global
climate change.1 The Arctic Ocean is thawing out. While many find this to
be a baromctcr indicating yct anothcr casualty of global warming, somc havc
found a silver lining to this black cloud. As the ice recedes, economic
opportunities begin to thaw. The first major development is access to new
shipping routes above Eurasia and North America.2 Currently, these routes
arc only passable during thc summer months, but circumnavigation is
predicted to become more and more accessible over the course of this century
until the northern routes are fully navigable year round.3 This has the
potcntial to drastically shorten shipping routes by thousands of miles and cit
transportation costs by millions of dollars.4
But perhaps even more significant are the receding ice sheets revealing
vast stores of natural resources that were pieviously inaccessible due (o yeat
round ice cover. ' New fisheries and billions of barrels of untapped
hydrocarbon reserves lie beneath the rapidly thawing ice, and if history has
taught us one thing, international powers will not Jet new worlds slip away
withojt taking thi ciit.6 As can be expected, this has created sornewhai of
an intcrnational conundrum as to who has the rights to what and how
resources hould be allocated. It would not be the first time that the prospect
* Staff Member, KY.J. EQUINE, AGRIC. &NAT. RESOURCES L, 2015-2016; B.A. 2012,
Indiana State University;, J.D. expected May 2017, University of Kentucky College of Law.
Scott G. Borgeronnrctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Impications of Glohal Warming,
87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63, 63 (2008).2
Id. at 69.
3Id. at 66-67.
'Id. at 69; Arthur Guschin, Understanding China's Arctic Policies, THE DIPLOMAT (Nov. 14,
2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/ll1understanding-chinas-arctic-policies/.
5 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctir, II S
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (July 23,2008).
'Id.; Guschin, supra note 4; Borgerson, supra note 1, at 67.
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of controlling vast amounts of resources has led to saber rattling and open
hostility
Today, nations operate through bilateral and multilateral agreements
largely facilitated by international governance structures and norms.
However, as the Arctic becomes more relevant due to climate change
concerns and economic development, nations have found themselves in a
quandary as to what law governs. Do the so-called "Arctic nations" - ie,
Russia, Canada, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and the
United States - have a superior, exclusive title to the region, and if so, what
determines their slice of the Arctic pie? If not, does ownership rely on
whomever is the first in time is the first in right? The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS") and the Arctic Council
could provide answers to these issues, but neither of these institutions have
the teeth necessary to substantially govern the region's economic
development and environmental preservation.
While there are no conclusive answers to these questions, there can be
no doubt that the Arctic offers tantalizing prospects for many, particularly
China. China has the fastest growing economy in the world and ravenously
consumes more natural tesources than any other nation to fiuel its Ibomi,,g
- albeit slowing - national economy.8 However, unlike other global powers
like the United States and Russia, China shares neither a geographical
border nor an ancestral ink to the Arctic region. Over the past twenty years,
these two very assertions have propped up China's aggressive stance in the
South and East China Seas.9 Here, China has used cultural and geographic
ties to challenge claims against many of its neighbors for tiny shoals and
islands boasting substantial mineral reserves." Now, with the thawing of the
Arctic Ocean, China appears to be turning its attention north by sending
shipping tankers and research vessels above the Arctic Circle, as well as
building icebreaker ships to facilitate China's future voyages through the
region."
China's need for resources and its hostile conduct at its borders have led
scholars to speculate about Beijing's true intentions in the Arctic. This Note
will attempt to analyze issues facing China in the context of their Arctic
7 See China's TerritorialDisputes, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 27,2014),
http://www.economiot.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/08/daily-chart-15.
'John Lee, A Slowing Chinese Economy Could Spell Fiscal Crisis, FORBES (Jan. 5,2016,7:30
AM), http://w-w.for+.c..com/itc,/re.alspin/2016/01,0.aowing chinexe economy coming fial
crisis/#3e3913fc2d57.
9 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7.
Id.
" China Is Making a HugeArctic Play - Even Though It Has No Claim, THE ECONOMIST (July
13, f0 11 .06 AM), ht tp:H,ww.buines inIider.con/eltina-i-iiit ig-ahiuge-a-cdc-play-2014-7.
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policies by first focusing on the environmental and legal ramifications of the
melting Arctic. Second, we will look at indications as to why and how China
might pursue its Arctic aspirations by analyzing its economic motivations,
current political entanglements with its neighbors in the South and East
China Seas, and how China reacts to possible constraints brought on by
international laws. Finally, we will discuss possible legal structures and what
the United States as the undisputed international hegemon can do in order
to curb aggressive behavior in the region by China.
II. BACKGROUND: A DEVASTATED ENVIRONMENT PRESENTING
HOT ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
A. The View Above the Arctic Circle
The Arctic ice sheet is melting rapidly. 1 In December 2015, The
National Snow and Ice Data Center estimated that the Arctic Ocean is
melting at an average rate of 4.7 percent per decade.13 This represents a
linear decline of the Arctic ice sheet from 1981 where the Arctic's year round
average ice coverage was roughly 1.23 million square miles, to this year's
approximately 3.9 million square mile coverage. 14 Additionally, average
temperatures between 2014 and 2015 were also alarmingly high. 15
Temperatures above the Arctic Circle in winter usually average a frigid -30
degices Faluenheit below zero; but it is predicted that temperatuies will
peak above freezing in January 2016.16 Between 2004 and 2005, the Arctic
lost nearly "1 percent of its perennial ice - the dense, thick ice" that makes
shipping lanes impassable.
1 7
This paints a grim picture for what is to come in the future, but it is the
summer months that present the most visible and alarming effects of global
climate change."8 For the first time in modern history, maritime vessels can
circumnavigate the globe above the Arctic Circle during the summer by
passing through thc Northcrn Sca Routc above Eurasia and the Northwcst
" See generally-lrctic Sea Ice andNeos/nalysis, NAT'L SNOW &ICE DATA CTR. (Jan. 5,2014),
available at http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/; see also Borgerson, supra note 1, at 66-67.
3 Jane Beider, Artic Sea Ice News andAnalysis, NAT'L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR. (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://nsidc.org/aricseaicenews/2015/12/a-variable-rate-of-ice-growth/.
14 id.
,"J. Overland et al., SurfaceAir Temperature, NATL OCEANIC &ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.
(Nov. 17,2015), http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard/air-temperature.html.
1
6
-Patrick Hogan, A Warm Winter Storm Is Bringing Bizarre Temperatures to the North Pole,
FUSION (Dec. 30,2015, 11:11 AM), http://fusion.net/story/250353/el-nino-north-pole-warm/; see
also NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, supra note 15.
17 Borgerson, supra note 1, at 66.
" See id. at 63, 66-67.
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Passage above North Anletica.'9 Iil the summer of 2008, the Aictic lost one
million square miles of ice cover reducing it to about half its size at the same
time 50 years earlier.2" By the end of this century, it is predicted that the
Arctic could be completely ice-free during the summer.1
Global commerce, however, is willing to take full advantage of the new
padiway. Shipping through the Norhern Sea Rout and Northwest Passage
has increased evcry ycar with a 53 pcrccnt incrcase between 2011 and 2012,
alone. ' Before, if a company were to ship goods from Seattle to the
Netherlands, the ship would have to travel down to the Panama Canal and
then on to Europe for a trip of 10,220 miles, and a voyage from Japan to the
Netherlands would be even greater.2' There, the freighter would need to
travel south through the Strait of Malacca, to the Suez Canal, and then
around continental Europe for a distance of 12,885 miles.' The northern
routs cut those voyages by thousands of nautical miles with a distance of
roughly 7,000 miles from Seattle to the Netherlands and only 6,500 miles
between Japan and the Netherlands."
The cumulative amount of money saved on fuel, shipping costs, and
man-hours at sea would be astronomical, and this sentiment will no doubt
be ieflected in die continually increasing use of those passages by inmitinie
nations. This isjust one of the reasons why China is taking a hard look at the
region along with the prospect of economic security by insnlating itself from
United States control over the Suez Canal.6 In fact, Chinese analysts predict
that between 5 and 15 percent of their shipping will be done over the
Northern Sea Rout by 2020.27 However, what makes the Arctic so valuable
(and dangerous) is the wealth of resources locked beneath its ice.
B. The Scramble for the Arctic
"Global warming has given birth to a new scramble for territory and
resources" in the Arctic.' For China as well as the Arctic nations, the North
Pole represents a vast wealth of untapped resources. They have not been
19 Id. at 68, 69.
'o Id. at 63.
21 
Id. at 66.
2 Guschin, supra note 4.
2 SEARATEs.CoM, https://www.searates.com/reference/portdistanceiB=10319&E-11175&
(3Lutd, fol "StAtL" ,I. d L "O~igin City" and "N dLclnads" in thc "Dth~tivn City") (last visitcd Apr.
22, 2015); see also Borgerson, supra note 1, at 69.
' SEARATES.COM, supra note 23 (search for "Netherlands" in the "Origin City" and "Japan" in
the "Destination City"); see also Borgerson, supra note 1, at 69.
'5 Borgerson, supra note 1, at 69.
' Guschin, supra note 4.
27 id.
- Borgerson, supra note 1, at 63.
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legally claimed by any nation outside their respective exclusive economic
zones ("EEZ"), or 200 miles extending off their shores, and there is no
substantial preexisting framework to indicate how the resources are to be
extracted and by whom.29 Even the European powers attempted to regulate
the Scramble for Africa's economic and political colonization of the
continent pursuant o the Berlin Conference of 1884-85.' This did not end
well for either Africa or Europe, but in the end those powers knew that in
order for conflict to be mitigated there must be order in the distribution of
resources.
31
Today we live in a much more globalized society where multilateral
cooperation amongst nations is generally the paradigm, but wars over
resources are not distant historical events. And if there has ever been a
resource that nations would come to blows over, it is hydrocarbons.32 The
U.S. Geological Survey ("USGS") conducted the most recent and extensive
survey of the Arctic region in 2008.33 The USGS found that the amount of
hydrocarbons that are recoverable (meaning economically feasible to extract)
from the Arctic Ocean floor amounted to a staggering sum.34 It speculates
that nearly 90 billion barrels of oil alone lay beneath the Arctic sea floor or
approximately 13 percent of the recoverable oil reserves left in the world.35
To compare, according to U.S. Energy Information Administration
("ELA"), Saudi Arabia has the second highest proven oil reserves in the
world with around 268 billion barrels.6 While the Arctic is not the next
Arabian Peninsula, 90 billion barrels is no paltry amount when considering
we are approaching peak oil production. The Arctic holds other
hydrocarbons in great quantities as well. " According to USGS, 1.670
trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 4 4 billion barrels of natural gas liquid lay
beneath the waning ice. Also, while energy developmcnt is at the forcfusnt
of the Arctic inquiry, the prospect of plentiful fisheries is under discussion as
well but in the pretext of conservation.39 A "donut hole" is beginning to
' See id. at 74.
30 Adam Hart-Davis et al., HISTORY: THE DEFINITIVE VISUAL GUIDE 360 (Angeles G.
Guerrero et al. eds., 2010).
31
See generally id. at 360-61.
32
Borgerson, supra note 1, at 67; U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 5.
3U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 5.
34 Id.
35 
id.
36 Venezuela, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https//www.eia.gov/beta/intemational/analysis.cfm?iso=VEN (last updated Nov. 25, 2015).
37 
See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 5.
38 Id.
39 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ARCTIC NATIONS SIGN DECLARATION TO PREVENT
UNREGULATED FISHING IN THE CENTRAL ARCTIC OCEAN (July 16,2015), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/244969.htm; seealso Ed Struzik, Melting Sea Ice Could Lead
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emerge in the ice of the central Arctic Ocean allowing fisherman to pass into
during the summer months. o Although the research is by no means
conclusive, a cursory survey of the region reveals Arctic cod and snow crab
around the border regions, but it is speculated that with warming waters
comes a migration of new, commercially viable species. 41 But with
commercial fishing comes a myriad of issues among which include
unregulated commercial fishing and threats to crucial food sources for
indigenous tribes.42 In fact, many of the Arctic's bordering regions have seen
commercial fishing outfits chase species like redfish and round-nosed
grenadier to the brink of extinction in those areas.43 This has lead Arctic
nations like the United States to push for joint resolutions with other states
to begin discussing and regulating this environment.4
Despite the fact that at this time there is no real plan for how to approach
dividing up these resources, countries are still hedging their bets and making
claims.45 Russia has even planted flags at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean.'
While these gestures have not been given legitimacy by other nations, Russia
is not breaking any international laws or guidelines, because there are none.
47
The Arctic is a "legal no man's land" with neither restrictions for particular
acts nor redressability for violations through binding international aw.4s
C. A Brief Overview of Maritime Law and the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea
The Arctic region is certainly a legal question mark, but while there may
be no legal framework with teeth, there is a body of law that could serve as a
suitable governance structure for future developments: the Law of the Sea.
Maritime law is an ancient legal doctrine dating back as far as 3000 B.C.E.,
with the early shipping routs between India and Babylon.49 In the second
century, the Roman Empire was one of the first government entities to
adopt a legal theory behind maritime law with the doctrine of mare liberum
to Pressure onArctic Fishery, YALE ENV*r 360 (May 10, 2012),
http://e360,yale.edu/feature/melting_!,eajiceLcould ead to-pressure on arctic-fshery/2526/; see also
SJ. Res. 17, 110th Cong. (2008).
o Struzik, supra note 39.41 
m.
42 See id.
43 id
44 See Struzik, supra note 39.
45 
Borgerson, supra note 1, at 63.
46Id.
47 m.
"d. at 74.
49 Jeffrey A. Levick, From Sovereignty to Fishing Rights: The Historical Evolution of the Law of the
Territorial Sea, 3 DIG. INT'L L. 36, 36 (1996).
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- the theory that the world's oceans are freely navigable."0 However, it was
not until the sixteenth century that the modem theory of the "territorial sea"
began to evolve into what we kmow of maritime law today, where nations
enjoy sovereign zones surrounding their coastal waters up to the
international limit - usually 12 miles - while the high seas remain free.
5 1
As late as the twentieth century, however, there was no formality in the
law of the sea; rather, it was a law of custom. 52 In an effort to create
uniformity in this ancient doctrine, the United Nations convened the Law
of the Sea Convention in 1958."3 What was created through subsequent
conventions would become UNCLOS. It outlined a comprehensive list of
topics needed for formal governance reflecting classic principles of maritime
law as well as addressing the needs of an economically and politically
globalized world.' UNCLOS provides a general structure for maritime law
by continuing the theory of the territorial seas," but it also defines the ineed
for EEZs where coastal states enjoy "sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting ... the natural resources" of a territory up to, but
not in excess of, 200 nautical miles off their coasts.5 6
Beyond economic development, UNCLOS also pushes resource
management and conservation "of the living resources of the high seas" in
order to "take measures which are designed, on the best scientific evidence
available . . . to maintain or restore populations of harvested species."
57
Similarly, UNCLOS governs the non-living resources of the oceans as well
"to foster healthy development of the world economy and balanced growth
of international trade" for the "orderly, safe and rational management of tie
resources of the Area. in accordance with sound principles of conservation
[] [and] the avoidance of unnecessary waste .... "58 Finally, and perhaps
most importantly for our purposes, UNCLOS provides a judicial structure.
The convention describes die oceans and its resources as "die conllon
heritage of mankind," but this is by no means an invitation for nations to
engage in unchecked development.9 By its very nature, what belongs to all
mankind cannot belong to one state, and any action by any one state that
purports to hoard that which bclongs to all mankind is given no recognition
50id.
5' See id. at 42, 48.5
2 SeegeneraUy id. at 36-37.
53 
Id. at 46.
5
4 id.
" See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea pt. II, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
56 Id. art. 56(1)(a), 57.
571d. art. 119.
5
1 Id. art. 150; see also id. pt. XII (detailing the preservation of the marine environment).59
1 Id. art. 136.
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by international law.' Indeed, this would be a harm inflicted on the world at
large. However, UNCLOS provides its signatories with a way to settle their
disputes through either arbitration or tribunal before the International
Seabed Authority.6 ' The convention also provides UNCLOS signatories
with automatic membership status, voting power, the ability to participate
in executive offices.62
This brief overview - which by no means captures the entire breadth of
UNCLOS - gives at least some indication of the types of issues facing the
Arctic Ocean. UNCLOS is comprehensive in scope, but perhaps the most
essential thread running throughout nearly every article of the Law of the
Sea is the need for cooperation aiongst states.' Guveiiiing die high seas is
not the job of one nation, but rather requires responsible action by both
coastal and land-locked countries alike. We do not need a document o teach
us the importance of our oceans both environmentally and economically, but
in order to preserve it we must encourage the use of law in its administration.
III. CHINA: ECONOMIC NEEDS AT HOME AND ARCTIC
OFFERINGS
A. The Veracious Appetite of the World's Workbench
The combination of the Arctic's resource rich territories coupled with
the lack of international governance structures makes for a volatile
combination. Without oversight, clashes over resources could ensue
amongst the great economic powers. As the largest economic producers in
the world lay claim to the last major energy sources around the globe, China
must seek out new mineral and hydrocarbon reserves. China boasts the
fastest growing and second largest economy in the world, accounting for an
astonishing one-third of the total growth in global commerce so far this
decade as compared to 17 percent by the United States.' This is largely due
to China's unparalleled success with its export-led growth model where
domestic and foreign coiporations invest in and utilize China's cheap labor
6 See id. art. 137.
61 
See generally id. annex V, VI.
62
Seegeneraly id. art. 159,160.
Seegenerally id. pt. H, V, VH, X.
64 Chris Matthews, Will the Crisis in China Sink the U.S. Economy?, FORTUNE (Sept. 2,2015,
7:21 AM), http://fortunecom/2015/09/02/china-cri.is-us-economy/; Euromonitor Rercarch, China -
App, aching he Endof Expoi-Led Growth Stoty?, EUROMONITOR INT'L (Mar. 16,2014), availahle u
hitp'/ibog, eurom~on itor. co!201 4/03/chin'i- .pprowching-the-end-of-e port-l -grar'h~ry html
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force and industrial infrastructure to manufacture their goods after which
they can then ship around the globe.
65
Because of this, China has been aptly named the "world's workbench,"
and while a multitude of factors have contributed to this perfect storm of
economic excellence, it could not have been achieved without unparalleled
energy consumption to support its industrial complex.6' In 2011, China
became the largest energy consumer in the world while in that same year it
became the global leader in electricity production.67 Thereafter in 2014,
China became the largest net importer of petroleum, and herein lays
Beijing's greatest challenge for continued future growth: resource security."
Simply put, China's economy is growing so quickly that it- production is
outstripping its ability to import and consume energy.69
China, like the United States, is a nation plentiful in coal with the third
largest coal reserves in the world.7' In 2012, coal accounted for 66 percent of
China's energy needs, but although it provides the country with an abundant
source of energy, the nation's heavy reliance on coal has wreaked havoc on
its environment, contributing to the smog-laden cities for which China is
quickly becoming notorious.71 Subsequently, China is looking to diversify its
energy base toward cleaner, more efficient energy sources such as oil and
natural gas, but China's petroleum reserves are woefully outmatched by its
energy needs.72 Beijing estimates that by 2020, the Chinese economy will
require 600 million tons of crude oil per year, which is over three times
China's production capacity.73 Exacerbating this further is the fact that the
United States, Russia, and the European Union already claim most of the
world's largest oil reserves, and China's claims in Iraq are evaporating along
with Baghdad's ability to maintain stability.74 Although China does trade
with some pariah nations that western states refuse to deal with, such as Iran,
Beijing is still struggling for energy security. With the tantalizing prospects
65
Euromonitor Research, supra note 64.
Seegenerally China: International Energy Data andAnalysis, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/beta/intemational/analysis-indudes/countries-long/China/china.pdf (last
updated May 14,2015).
67 id.
68 Id.
69 id.
' Countries with the Biggest CoalReserves, MINING-TECHNOLOGY.COM (Nov. 21,2013),
http://www.mining-technology.com/features/feature-the-worlds-biggest-coal-reserves-by-country/.
71 id.
'Id.; see also Peter S. Goodman, Big Shyi in China's Oil Policy, WASHINGTON POST (July 13,
2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/artide/2005/07/12/AR2005071201546.htnl.
3 Id.
74
id.
75 
SeegenerallyJOHN W. GARVER, CHINA AND IRAN: ANCIENT PARTNERS IN A POST-
IMPERIAL WORLD (University of Washington Press 2006).
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of massive oil reserves and other resources in the Arctic, Beijing is
positioning itself as a future benefactor in the region.76
B. Beijing's Arctic Strategy
Given China's shortage of domestically produced hydiocaxbon reserves,
it should come as no surprise that Beijing has had a long-time, strategic
interest in the Arctic region.' To become a valid player in the region, it must
gain access to scientific insight and the international institutions that will
come to govern the region. Without any predisposed cultural or political
connections to the Arctic, Beijing must demonstrate a valid connection to
the region. In order to do this, China is ensuring its position in the Arctic in
three crucial ways by (1) conducting climatological research, (2) investing in
resources bilaterally through its connections to Arctic states, and (3) opting
for permanent membership on the Arctic Council.
The Chinese have not only been slowly ratcheting up their use of the
Northern Sea Rout for commercial purposes, but Heijing has made it an
important point to conduct research in the Arctic.7" This has been achieved
in two primary forms. First, Beijing has funded several research missions to
the region aimed at climatological research, which have resulted in an
increasing amount of articles published by Chinese scholars regarding both
the environmental and strategic importance of the Arctic. 79 China has
characterized itself as a "near-Arctic state" because, although it does not
share a border with the region, it is directly affected by global climate
change. " This is understandable considering China's coastline measures
over 9,000 miles in length, and the vast majority of its industrial
infrastructure is housed on the coast."1 Beijing also argues that it has an
undeniable place at the table, not only because of its sheer size and economic
76 Seegeneraly id.
' Olga Alexeeva & Fr&ldric Lasserre, China and theArctic, ARTIC YEARBOOK 2012, Jan. 2012,
at 80,81-82, available at
http://www.reseawthgate.net/profile/OlgaAlexeeva/publication/259042084_China and the Arctic/li
nks/Oc960529ce2575a172000000.pdf.
7 See id. at 81-82; see also Guschin, supra note 4.79 
Alexeeva &Lasserre, supra note 77, at 81; see also Tang Guoqiang, Arctic Issues and Cbina's
Stance, CHINA INST. OF INT'L STUDIES (Mar. 4,2013), http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-
03/04/content_5772842.htm.
'o Guschin, supra note 4.
THE WORLD FACTBOOK, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (last visited Apr. 20, 2016),
https'J/www.cia.gov/iibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/fildd/2060.html.
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power, but also because it is a major player in shaping the future of the
environment.
82
Beijing's increasing investment in icebreaker technology, which allows
research vessels to penetrate further into the Arctic's interior, is China's
second form of interest in the Arctic.' 3 In 1993, China purchased from
Ukraine a Russian-made icebreaker ship equipped with advanced navigation
and weather equipment as well as a helicopter launch pad, and in 2010,
China sent the icebreaker to the Arctic to aid one of its research teams.
4
Furtheriiote, in 2011 alone, tie Chinese government invested $300 million
to build a modern icebrcakcr.8 5 Govcrnment officials say that thcy intcnd to
conduct polar expeditions for more than 200 days annually with these two
research vessels.'
Beijing has been increasing its economic presence in the region as well.'
China is not only growing its economic output, but it is also developing the
size of its infrastructure. 8 This means building more factories . and
skyscrapers at unprecedented rates, and this requires vast amounts of steel.
China is by far the world leader in steel production. 9 In 2014, China
produced more steel than the next sixty-five leading steel-producing
countries in the world combined, totaling an output of over 822 million tons
of stee 9° Steel requires iron ore, and to maintain its mineral security China
must diversify its importation sources, which it has done in the Arctic.
91
State-owned enterprises such as Sinosteel and China Communication
Corporation have invested heavily in the Isua Iron Mine in Greenland,
which is expected to produce 15 million tons of iron ore starting in 2015.'
Currently, there is no one international governance structure in the
Arctic to handle environmental, political, and legal issues, like the U.N. or
the IMF do elsewhere. However, this may be the future function of the
Arctic Council, which recently met in late 2015 and appointed the United
'8 Matthew Willis & Duncan Depledge, How We Learned to Stop WorryingAbout CbinasArctic
Ambitions: Understanding China's Admission to theArctic Council. 2004-2013, in HANDBOOK OF THE
POLITICS OF THE ARCTIC, 388, 394 (Leif C. Jensen & Geir Honneland eds., 2015).
3 Alexeeva& Lasserre,, supra note 77, at 82.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 id,
's Guschin, supra note 4.
88 Id.
"v See WORLD STEELASS'N, STEEL STATISTICAL YEARBOOK2015 (Oct. 2015) available at
http://www.worldteel.org/dms/internetDocumentList/bookshop/2015/Steel- Statistical-Yearbook
2015/document/Steel/o2OStatistical%2OYearbook%202015.pdf.
90 Id.
' Guschin, supra note 4.
92 Id.
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States as the new Chair of the Council.93 As of now, the primary function of
the Arctic Council is to address climate-change issues as well as rights of the
indigenous tribes of the Arctic. 94 Voting power rests with the eight current
member states - Russia, Canada, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark,
Iceland, and the United States. 9' China, on the other hand, is only an
observer state with no voting rights and, therefore, no substantive power.%
To better achieve its goals, Beijing realizes the importance of becoming
a full member in the future, and its lack of membership has not stopped
China from using its substantial economic power as a "near-Arctic" state to
better align themselves with other Arctic nations.' Beijing has been able to
make a strong bid for becoming a full member by establishing "bilateral
economic contacts" with some of the smaller Arctic member-states.9s One
of China's primary interests in the region is driven by the need for greater
food security, and the fisheries around Greenland and Iceland have proven
themselves valuable to Sino-Icelandic and Denmark relations.99 In exchange
for access to their fisheries, the Chinese have agreed to provide much needed
capital infusions to these smaller members of the Council to help "ensure
support for [China's] permanent membership."1" "In 2010, China provided
Iceland with a $500 million-plus currency swap," and $740 million to
Denmark in energy and agricultural assistance.1 °1 This appears to be paying
off with Denmark and Iceland, and Sweden and Norway have declared an
interest in "discussing Chia's future role on the Council.""°2 However,
while Beijing stands to gain big if it is given both a seat at the decision-
making table and rights to the wealth of Arctic resources, without an
overarching governance structure we can only speculate how nations will
maneuver themselves in making a claim.
93 History oftbeArctic Counci, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-
council.org/indexphp/en/about us/arctic council (last updated Sept. 16, 2015).
94id.
95 id.
96 Observers, ARTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-
council/observers (last updated Feb. 12, 2016).
97 See Guschin, supra note 4.
98 Id
99Id.
'0 Id.
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IV. NERVE-RACKING: INSIGHTS INTO CHINA'S REGIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL POLICIES
It is dear that the melting Arctic ice is not going to impact China alone.
Rising tides drastically impact coastal nations, and the revelation of
untapped resources can have major consequences on the world market.
Thus, the debate is not what potential gains states can obtain, but rather
what their desired outcomes are and how they will be achieved. In this way
China occupier a pivotal, yet precarious place in the development of the
Arctic. China is an aspiring global power that has seen unprecedented
growth in the last thirty-five years.1" As a consequence, China has seen
rapid modernization, and mass migrations from the interior to the coastal
cities have created a cultural shift from being primarily an agricultural nation
to an industrial one. " Furthermore, China has become a more active
participant in international politics. 105 To sustain its economic and
diplomatic rise, China must both diversify its resource base and maintain its
status in a global community, where interactions are built on long-
established norms.1"
However, while much of the West adherers to these international norms
(mainly because western nations created them), China is different. China is
a relatively young industrial power that sees itself as an outsider forced to
conform to the Westphalian international system it had no hand in
creating1" It is this veiy mentality that causes speculation about China's
desired outcome in the Arctic. China's predominant motivations in the
region are not unusual - concerns about global climate change and the need
for mineral stores, food reserves, and especially energy security - but the
lengths Beijing if willing to go lead some to believe that China is preparing
to make more assertions in the Arctic. The most telling way to gain insight
into this issue is to look at (1) China's aggressive interactions with its
neighbor-states, (2) how it regards the existing international governance
structurcs and norms, and (3) Bcijing's theory binding itself to lcgitimatc
claims in the Arctic.
10
3 
See MICHAEL B. YAHUDA, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ASIA PACIFIC 270-90
(Michael Leifer ed., Routledge 3d rev. ed. 2011).
"04 See id. at 271; See also Kam Wing Chan, China, InternalMigration, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF GLOBAL MIGRATION 1, 1-46. (Peter Bellwood & Immanuel Ness eds., Blackwell Publishing
2011).
s Id. at 284.
106 SeegenerallyJOSEPH S. NYE, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: AN
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A. Multiplicity: China's Territorial Disputes
The Arctic is not the first place where the Chinese government has
found itself in conflict with other nations over "disputed" land, particularly
with its neighbor states. 108 Over the past sixty years, Beijing has been
involved in multiple territorial disputes, and while the Chinese government
has no control over these lands, it asserts itself - sometimes militarily - in
these regions."° These disputes are focused primarily in the Himalayas and
in the South and East China Seas."' In the West, China claims Arunachal
Pradesh, a massive area currently controlled by India."' China also won a
brief war with India over land next to Kashmir that India still lays claim to."
More recent headlines show China's startling claims over tiny, deserted
island dusters in die South and East China Seas.11 The most imnediately
dangerous dispute is with Japan, America's primary ally in the region, over
territory known in China as the Diaoyu Islands and in Japan as the Senkaku
Islands, which are speculated to be rich in nil -nd natural gas.1 14Altbough
China claims these islands have always been part of its territory, in 2012
Japan nationalized the islands when it purchased the land from its private
owner.115 Consequently, the Chinese appear to be saber-rattling by sending
naval patrols and military jet fighters on fly-by missions around the
islands. 16 Moreover, China has developed a missile defense system that
covers the islands and requires identification from vessels that pass into the
region."' This situation is precarious because Japan and the disputed islands
are under the U.S. military umbrella.1 America's largest naval group, the
Seventh Fleet, is based injapan and is viewed by China as a national security
threat. 19 Japan's acquisition of the islands threatens to sour relations
between the two largest powers in the region and also threatens to create a
rift in the Sino-American relationship with the potential for heightened
military escalation.'
'c See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7; see also YAHU-A, supra note 103, at 287.
10 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7; see also YAUDA, supra note 103, at 287.
110 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7; see also YAHUDA, supra note 103, at 287.
110 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7; see also YAHUDA, supra note 103, at 293.
12 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7; see also YAHUDA, supra note 103, at 293.
113 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7.
14Id.
11 Id.
16Id.
117 id.
118 See isd.
19 Lucas Tomlinson, US Navy Deploys Several Ships to South China Sea as Tensions Rise, FOX
NEWS (Maa. 4, 2016), itt//,Vww.foxncws.com/ o oid/2016/03/04/us -fay dcploys scycral ships to-
south-china- sea.html.
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Meanwhile, territorial disputes in the South China Sea are even more
complex. It is suspected that the South China Sea it rich in hydrocarbons
making it a tempting source for Chinese drilling exploration, which has
already started in the Paracel Islands," However, Vietnam also claims this
territory as its own." The Spratly Islands are another source of conflict
involving China, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia, who all claim control of
the island chain.' The Chinese navy has gone as far as physically expelling
the Philippines from the surrounding reefs."t China's entire show of force
in the region is based around a map dating from the 1940s showing the now
infamous "Nine Dash Line" around much of the South China Sea, and
according to Beijing, everything within the line rightfully belongs to
China. U5
Of course, all of this says nothing about the long-nationalized region of
Tibet or the largely Muslim province ofXinjiang, both of which profess their
independence from China. 6 With China's military recognition system in
the east and forceful encroachment in the south, some nations have accused
Beijing of using "salami slicing tactics" to push its maritime borders further
and backing its expansion with an expanding navy and air force. 7 While
these territorial disputes and nationalized lands make it unsurprising that
nations like Japan, Vietnam, and even the United States are leery about the
rise of China, it is also telling about China's regard for the international
system.
B. (Dis)regard: China's Lack of Adherence to UNCLOS and International
Institutions
China is a signatory to UNCLOS, and although China has had no hand
in creating the international system we know today, its ratification of the
convention must symbolize acceptance of its model. ' After all, Beijing
might be unsatisfied to some degree with the Western system of
international relations, but the People's Congress and the Standing
'
5
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mId.
123 Id.
124 id.
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useeXinjiang Territory Profile - Overview, BBC NEWS (Oct. 14,2014),
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Committee, who are pragmatic and fearful of unnecessary entanglements,
traditionally prefer bilateral rather than multilateral international
relations. 9 From this it might be safe to infer that Beijing sees something
desirable in joining UNCLOS. It at least shows a willingness to be a team
player - even if begrudgingly - and a desire to be involved in widely accepted
international institutions, but where China utilizes these benefits it has also
taken advantage of the convention's weaknesses.'
UNCLOS lacks substantial teeth to enforce its own measures.33 The
convention is very similar to American uniform laws in the sense that it takes
long-standing maritime practices, such as the territorial sea doctrine (giving
coastal nations sovereign waters while keeping the high seas open), and also
creates a governance structure to deal with legal, environmental, scientific,
and resource-related issues.32 But what is a system of laws if it can be broken
with little consequence?
Because of this inherent lack of enforcement, China may invoke the
convention when it is convenient and ignore it when it sees fit. ' To
demonstrate, one need only look to China's boundary waters, where the
United States has a substantial presence. The Navy's largest fleet is stationed
there, and although this frustrates China's expansionist goals, the United
States is adhering to what has been deemed lawfully acceptable by centuries
of maritime custom. 3 The United States is using and protecting the
sovereign waters of its allies, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, and it is also
patrolling international waters.135 Despite this, China calls foul; invoking an
exaggerated efinition of its EEZ and calling American military surveillance
illegal. ' However, this activity cannot be considered illegal because the
Navy is not interfering with China's economic exploits in the region.3 7 In
fact, UNCLOS allows these activities in the EEZs of coastal nations.38
1
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Furthermore, China's own exploits in the East and South China Seas
can be considered illegal acts under UNCLOS. China is attempting to shut
down the use of these maritime territories by creating recognition systems in
the East China Sea overJapan's Senkaku Islands and forcefully expelling the
Philippines from islands in the South China Sea.139 This is a direct violation
of Part II, § 3(A)(17), which states, "all States... enjoy the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea.""4 Innocent passage is defined as any
movement - economic or military - in these regions that is not "prejudicial
to the peace, order and security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea."41
While Beijing could similarly point to this provision to prop up its own
counter analysis of the situation, these islands and surrounding waters are
not "territorial" as defined in Part II, § 2 of UNCLOS.42 These territories
are disputed, and if the Chinese are serious about adhering to and enforcing
the provisions of UNCLOS, its representatives should utilize the
International Seabed Authority to arbitrate these disputes rather than
expelling nations with equally viable claims at gunpoint.
C. Binding tbe Arctic to the Middle Kingdom
What does this mean for China's future stake in the Arctic? Since China
does not have a geographic or cultural claim to die Arctic, it must bolster its
claims to the Arctic in other ways. Arctic nations, especially those with a
geological connection to the Arctic continental shelflike the United States,
Russia, and Canada, already maintain EEZs stretching up to 200 miles off
their coasts.'" These nations can also directly claim national security issues
and social concerns related to tribal populations that call the Arctic Circle
home.'" China does not have this luxury. Although China cannot claim
direct national security concerns, Beijing's ties are more general. We have
already discussed the localized impacts global warming has on China's
coastal infrastructure as well as its greater use of icebreaker technology to
facilitate Arctic research.'45 We have also seen that China is establishing
beneficial relationships with the smaller Arctic nations by exchanging cash
infusions for mineral and fishing rights.1"
139 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7.
'
46
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Beijing has a substantive claim to the Arctic by utilizing the rhetoric of
UNCLOS to show that the northern seas and its resources are the "common
heritage of mankind."147 The language speaks of equity; however, some
Chinese scholars and military leaders are expressing more radical views in
publications (which would likely not be made public unless condoned by the
editorial hand of the Chinese government) that China should begin
asserting its claims in the Arctic. 14 However, some scholars are not
convinced that China is going to start planting flags on the Arctic sea floor
anytime soon. First, China has more to gain developing its Arctic claims
through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy with other Arctic states rather
than unilaterally action.149 China cannot afford to sour relations with major
trading partners like the United States if it is to have a voice in the fiture of
the Arctic. Second, China's behavior in the South and East China Seas are
not indicative of future policies in the Arctic. " China's assertions in its
coastal waters are built upon cultural and geographic ties to those disputed
territories, but without similar claims in the Arctic, Beijing must go about
its business in a different way to avoid upsetting international ties.nl
This Note is by no means a call to arms against the rise of China, nor is
it an assumption that China will continue acting unreasonably with respect
to the Arctic. However, it should be understood that China's disregard for
widely accepted international paradigms and the willingness to use force
against its neighbor states is cause for caution. The Arctic is a legal no-man's
lUand, and to use thc argumcnt that thc high scas arc thc common heritage of
mankind can easily excuse unchecked exploration by an aggressive state
actor in dire need of the very resources the Arctic has to offer. Beijing
certainly stands to gain more by being a team player, and its pragmnatisnm in
other areas of international relations demonstrates as much. Furthermore,
its lack of cultural and territorial connections with the Arctic could lead
China to go about making claims in a more rational fashion. In this same
way, however, China is failing to demonstrate that it is unwilling to go after
disputed regions laden with precious resources by more forceful means. It is
a risk that nteed not be taken whexi we have at o-' lisposql a viable set of Jaws
in UNCLOS and a framework of international leadership.
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V. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STRUCTURES AND U.S. LEADERSHIP WILL BE THE KEY
At this point, beyond the twelve-mile sovereign territories and the larger
EEZs no one owns the Arctic. While it remains an open question as to how
exactly the global community will govern this opening frontier, it is
understood that the world will have to deal with an ice-free Arctic in the near
future. The Arctic needs law and order, or the result will be unchecked
underwater land grabs followed by resource disputes and ultimately a
destroyed ecosystem, much like the rest of the world's oceans which have
become over-fished waste depositories. It is a grim depiction of political,
economic, and environmental turmoil. However, we can project how quicldy
the Arctic is thawing giving us a timetable for creating a set of laws to ensure
that there will be no more harm than has already been done.
We cannot save this ecosystem in its current, dying state, but time is on
our side to help it transition into a new one that is both healthy and helpful.
Perhaps for the first time in our globalized world, we as a race know
something is going to happen that will impact us all in the same way, and we
can ensure a desired outcome by passing and enforcing laws. However, the
whole structure could unravel if one major state actor undermines it, and
China's aggressive behavior toward its neighbors and subversion of the
current international system should raise caution amongst other nations.
After all, breaking international norms is not illegal if there are no laws to
enforce them. To this end, the Arctic region needs (1) a governing set of
enforceable laws and (2) leadership in creating governance structures.
In our current international system, we utilize supranational
organizations to govern certain international interests like economics and
human rights, but we still desire to maintain our own national sovereignty.
That is to say that we do not want to hand over our fundamental decision
making power to international organizations, and this same problem will
affect who will make decisions in the Arctic."5 2 There must be something to
curb aggressive behavior by other nations. In this situation, traditional
principles of property law simply will not suffice. Doctrines like the rule of
capture and the prior appropriation theory will only result in political
turimoil and a rapid depletion of resouices.K' Instead, we should use existing
'
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htenational histitutions that arc alrcady equipped to deal with the political,
economic, and environmental issues facing the Arctic, UNCLOS and the
Arctic Council.
UNCLOS is a comprehensive set of laws that embraces centuries-old
maritime norms while also addressing modem political, economic, and
environmental issues. "s The convention already contains a judicial
framework where signatories can redress their grievances against other
nations,155 but in order to have the force of law it must have an established
remedy. This can be achieved through any number of means including
sanctions, revocation of resource rights, and monetary damages. However,
despite UNCLOS's breadth of coverage of issues, it lacks the specificity
found in modem statutes, making the Law of the Sea in its current for more
a set of guidelines rather than rules. Along with its more general terms,
UNCLOS should lay out detailed parameters for governing the Arctic's
trade routes and resource developments. It should maintain strong
environmental regulations while still respecting the native tribes that inhabit
the Arctic Circle.
The Arctic Council would likely be the best equipped institution to carry
out the Law of the Sea in the region. It is a "pre-made" governance body that
already meets semi-regularly and has an internal structure of full and
observing members.56 For now, the Arctic Council is primarily a forum to
discuss environmental issues, but it could be given this additional
authority.1" 7 The Arctic Council could be converted to a branch of the U.N.
and the Arctic states and members of the Security Council- including China
- could be full members. Without China's involvement, the Arctic Council
will be missing a vital piece of the conversation, especially on pollution
emissions. Next, UNCLOS needs to be an enforceable set of laws with the
International Seabed Authority acting as its judiciary, presided over by the
Arctic states as permanent members of the tribunal with participation by
rotating observer states. This will ensure that the Arctic states, which have
the most immediate concerns, will have a permanent voice, and it allows
observing states, even landlocked ones, to become part of the discussion,
which is in keeping with the spirit of UNCLOS. Indeed, several of its
provisions speak to the importance of allowing landlocked and developing
his individual use, has deprived him of hit natural liberty, and brought him within hit certain controL");
see also Houston & Tex. Cent Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 281 (Tex. 1904) ("[Tlhe use of the water..
k 4,rith'n the ight of the owner of the nil, wbhtever may be its effect upon his neighhr's wells 9nd
springs.").
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nations to have a voice in maritime law.'58 This will also help ensure that
developing nations, like China, will have access to resources in the Arctic but
in a highly structured fashion.'
59
However, all of this is highly theoretical. Of course this
recommendation is meaningless if no one initiates the enforcement of
UNCLOS. Without its implementation, the door is opened for the very
problems this recommendation seeks to prevent. To accomplish this, some
nation must take the initial leadership role and the United States is in the
best position to do so. The United States is unquestionably the hegemonic
power in the world with the most international clout. The United States is a
military and economic leader, a permanent member of the Security Council,
one of the Arctic states, and is the current Chair of the Arctic Council."6
These factors place the United States in the best position to touch off the
creation of Arctic law. However, the United States is not a signatory to
UNCLOS. 161 America's absence from the treaty hinders any future
leadership in several ways, but the most important factor is that the United
States cannot redress grievances against other UNCLOS member-states as
long as it is not a member as well.
Tn he nn effective leader in the Arctic's future, the United States must
ratify UNCLOS and become a signatory. Some argue that this is a moot
point, especially in rcgards to curbing China's aggrcssivc bchavior toward its
neighbors and the U.S. military presence in the East China Sea, and that the
most effective way to deal with Beijing is for the United States to continue
reassuring its regional allies and maintain military pressure in the East
China Sea. 162 Also, some right wing American groups complain that
ratifying UNCLOS would be tantamount to giving away America's
economic prospects in the Arctic altogether.'
63
These concerns are misplaced. The Arctic is a region that is untested by
international law, and even with the United States spearheading the
development of international law in the region, it is unlikely to alienate
Beijing. China views the Arctic as a region that belongs to all nations, not
just the Arctic states. If the United States brings Beijing to the negotiation
table instead of pushing China out, it would create the opportunity for joint
success without the need for a military presence. Furthermore, the American
right-wing view is too narrowly focused. It forgets that the United States
' UNCLOS, supra note 55, art. 148.
159 Id.
'60 U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, U.S. DEPI OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/uschair/ (last visited Apr. 22,2016).
161 UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTIONS, supra note 128.
S
62
ee Blumenthal &Mazza, supra note 129.
163 See Coffey et al., supra note 152.
2015-20161
570 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRic. & NAT. RESOURCES L. [VOL.8 No.3
maintains an incredibly broad economic base around the globe and also that
the United States already has an EEZ above the Arctic Circle through
Alaska."6 The United States would not be left out of the discussion or lose
any rights. Finally, the Arctic issue must be looked at dtough a global lens.
The world must be concerned about resource preservation rather than
unchecked accession of wealth to the exclusion of others, and the only way
this is to be achieved is to have an international governance structure that
addresses Arctic issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
No matter the fate of the Arctic Circle, China is a lynchpin in its future.
China's unparalleled economic growth and consumption, the future impact
of rising tides on its coastal industrial centers due to the melting poles, and
its ever-increasing need for energy security ensure that it will be at the
negotiation table for years to come. In this way, China's needs and concerns
are not unlike those of the United States and other industrialized western
nations; however, its track record of aggressive behavior toward its
neighbors and undermining international la, continue to make its future
intentions in the Arctic suspect. Beijing's interest in the region is ippirent
from its push for scientific research, its increased utilization of the Northern
Sea Route, and its involvement with smaller Arctic states. However, these
challenges are not without solutions. The Arctic is currently a lawless
territory, but aggressive behavior can be curtailed by focused guidance from
the United States and enforceable legal institutions like UNCLOS and the
Arctic Council. This is the best way to ensure that some goodwill come from
our failure to restrain the progress of global climate change.
'"See U.S. Maritime Limits & Boundaries, NOAA OFFICE OF COAST SURVEY,
hltp//wwwn- aiti-achats-noaagov/csdl/nbound.htm (Inst updated Sept, 13, 2013).
